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Philosophy, Psychology, and the Gods 
 in Seneca’s Hercules Furens 
 
Résumé : 
Le rapport entre les tragédies de Sénèque et la philosophie est un sujet canonique de 
recherche. Ici nous abordons ce lien à travers l’étude de l’Hercules Furens, qui suscite 
deux questions importantes. D’abord, quelle est la nature de la santé mentale, et de 
quelle manière est-elle reliée aux exploits, crimes, délires, et besoins d’expiation 
d’Hercule? Deuxièmement, quels sont les liens entre la santé mentale et les Dieux, au 
regard notamment de l’hostilité de Juno ? Dans la première partie de cet article une 
réponse sera donnée du point de vue stoïcien. Dans cette persective, la démence du 
héros doit être comprise comme le résultat de jugements erronés, qui sont au coeur de 
son crime, sa souffrance, et son aliénation à Jupiter. Cette explication est cependant 
incomplète, puisqu’elle n’éclaire ni le délire d’Hercule ni la haine de la déesse. Dans 
la deuxième partie de cet article, une réponse sera par conséquent donnée du point de 
vue d’une philosophie contemporaine. Bernard Stiegler propose que les relations entre 
les pensées et les sentiments soient plus complexes que les stoïciens ne le croient, 
surtout en ce qui concerne le pouvoir de « faire attention »; il suppose que l’ « esprit » 
qui pense et ressent soit étendu à l’environnement; et il intégre à ce système 
« spirituel » des entités plus ambiguës que le Dieu stoïcien, bien qu’il ne les examine 
pas suffisament en détail. Sa philosophie nous permet donc d’expliquer le délire, le 
crime, et le besoin d’expiation comme des éléments d’un écosystème plus large, qui 
incluent non seulement les pensées et les passions, mais également les relations 
personelles, les mains et les armes, les idéaux et les Dieux. Ainsi nous pouvons 
clarifier à la fois le rapport de Juno au démence du héros et la spiritualité invoquée 
par Stiegler. En conclusion, le rapport entre la tragédie de Sénèque et la philosophie 
est dynamique et réflexif : l’Hercules Furens porte à la scène une vision qui peut 
s’expliquer partiellement par le stoïcisme ou la philosophie de Bernard Stiegler ; en 
même temps, elle révèle les limites de ces systèmes doctrinaux.  
 
 The relation of Seneca’s tragedies to his straightforwardly philosophical prose 
is a canonical one for scholarship1, even if it is more often noted as a problem than 
explored in detail. In this article, I will approach this relation via Hercules Furens, 
which sets in relief two important issues.  
                                                        
1 Particularly thought-provoking, from a range of methodologies: C. GILL, Seneca on 
Selfhood: Integration and Disintegration, Seneca and the Self, S. BARTSCH and D. 
WRAY (eds.), Cambridge, 2009, 65-83; T. G. ROSENMEYER, Senecan Drama and 
Stoic Cosmology, Berkeley, University of California, 1989; V. LAURAND, La 
parrhêsia tragique: l’exemple d’un échec, Ítaca: Quaderns Catalans de Cultura 
Clàssica, 28-29, 2012-2013, 147-65; C. A. J. LITTLEWOOD, 2004, Self-
Representation and Illusion in Senecan Tragedy, Oxford, esp. 15-102.  
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 The first concerns Hercules’ delirium. We recall that in the prologue, the 
goddess Juno resolves to destroy Hercules by driving him mad. The play opens with 
Hercules away in the underworld, Thebes ruled tyrannically by Lycus, and Hercules’ 
wife first wooed and then threatened by the tyrant; after he returns, learns what is 
happening, and kills Lycus, Hercules is overcome by a fit of madness and murders his 
wife and children. When he recovers lucidity, he begs his father and Theseus (who 
has meanwhile arrived) to give him his weapons, only gradually coming to accept that 
enduring his condition is a more virtuous act than killing himself.  
 This plot dramatizes two conditions that coalesce in the Stoic formulation of 
the end, namely sanity and virtue. What does it mean to be of healthy mind, and when 
– if ever – is Hercules in that condition? What is the nature of virtue, and how does it 
relate to Hercules’ exploits, delirium, crime, and urge for expiation? The Stoic 
answers to all these questions revolve around understanding the reason things happen, 
which is god as “ruler and guardian of the universe, master and craftsman of this 
work; ... fate, on which all things depend, the cause of causes; ... providence, ... by 
whose planning this world is taken care of, so that it flows freely and unfolds its 
activities” (Sen. NQ 2.45.1-2)2. To what extent, I will ask, does Hercules’ plot 
challenge and enrich the Stoics’ psychology of health and virtue and its theological 
underpinning? 
 The second issue dovetails with the first, insofar as Hercules’ struggle toward 
sanity and virtue is simultaneously a quest to become divine. The problem of 
divinization is strikingly prominent in the tragedy. To recall only a few highlights, 
Juno relates that Hercules “is spoken of as a god all over the world” (39-40) and 
worries that “he’s seeking a path to the gods above” (74; cf. 89-90, 276-7, 437, 569); 
                                                        
2 All translations from Greek or Latin are my own.  
  3 
Amphitryon corrects his prayer to “the governer and father of the heavenly ones” by 
asking, “Why am I calling in vain on the gods? Wherever you are, my son, hear me!” 
(516-19); and Hercules, raving that “my father promises the stars,” threatens to lead a 
rebellion against “my father’s faithless kingdom” (966).  
 While this might appear to be a particularly mythical problem, the aspiration 
to become godlike is very important to ancient Stoicism as well. Seneca writes, 
Just as the body’s posture is erect and looks toward heaven, so the mind, 
which extends as far as it wishes, has been naturally formed to want things 
equal to the gods. If it uses its own powers and expands to its own dimensions, 
then by its proper road it strives for the highest things. Going to heaven would 
be an enormous labor; the mind goes back there. (Ep. Mor. 92.30; cf. 9.16, 
31.11, 41.3-5, 76.23, 85.20, 87.19-21, 93.8, Dial. 1.1.5; etc. 3)  
 
Wanting things “equal to the gods” (paria dis) means both wanting divine wellbeing 
and wanting what god wants – namely what providence actually causes to happen. 
Despite Seneca’s reassurance that this ascension should not be an “enormous labor” 
(magnus labor), the philosophical “return” to divinity remains a Herculean task: by 
unspoken convention, no Stoic ever claims to have attained their declared end. Thus 
Hercules’ tragic yearning for heaven finds a significant analogy in the unfulfillable 
Stoic project of becoming wise4.  
 However, we must immediately temper this analogy by noting that the furious 
hostility of Hercules’ Juno is hard to reconcile with the benevolence of Stoic god. 
Scholars have explored how Seneca’s Hercules falls under the literary-historical 
shadow of Virgil’s Aeneas, who brings with him the wrath of Juno as the burden of 
                                                        
3 For a fuller discussion, see J. P. COMELLA, Une piété de la raison: Philosophie et 
religion dans le stoïcisme impérial. Des Lettres à Lucilius de Sénèque aux Pensées de 
Marc Aurèle, Turnhout, Brepols, 89-186.  
4 Compare Jean-Noël MICHAUD, L’Hercules Furens: De la folie dans la tragédie à la 
tragédie, spectacle de la folie, Vita Latina 136, 1994, 12-13, 16-18; G. DELEUZE, 
Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. C. V. Boundas, London, 
Bloomsbury, 149-50.  
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Roman civilization5. They have also argued that Seneca’s tragic theology reflects a 
characteristically Neronian pessimism6. Yet neither of these insights makes Juno any 
more compatible with Stoicism. Perhaps it is for this reason that Seneca’s tragedies 
are missing from the index to Jordi Comella’s massive study of imperial Stoic 
religion7, and in general are still neglected by students of Stoicism. I suggest that this 
is a missed opportunity; the problems of divine agency and human ritual in Hercules 
are valuable supplements for Stoic theology. Not only that, but thinking through them 
provides a new perspective on the malaise of Seneca’s tragic universe – and, by 
implication, Nero’s Rome. Finally, inasmuch as god plays a central role in Seneca’s 
ethics, this tragedy also suggests lessons about Stoic and neo-Stoic arts of therapy and 
self-cultivation.        
 We should recall that Seneca’s primary source text, Euripides’ Herakles, 
vividly highlights the relationship of human feelings, thoughts, and actions with 
inhuman forces. Brooke Holmes has illuminated how multiple explanatory narratives 
converge on the enigma of Herakles’ “symptom” as a bodily and mental event: the 
unseen, impersonal, inhuman powers of the bodily interior overlap with the unseen, 
personified, divine powers of Hera and Lussa. Herakles’ final “labor” in Euripides’ 
play is to resist simplifying narratives, accept the interplay of personal and impersonal 
forces in his actions, and undertake the painful task of recuperating their 
                                                        
5 Of course, Ovid’s Juno also influences Seneca. See C. V. TRINACTY, Senecan 
Tragedy and the Reception of Augustan Poetry, New York, Oxford USA, 2014, 130-
37; E. WILSON, Mocked with Death: Tragic Overliving from Sophocles to Milton, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 2004, 99-100; J. G. FITCH, Seneca’s Hercules Furens, 
Ithaca, Cornell, passim.  
6 G. BRADEN, The Rhetoric and Psychology of Power in the Dramas of Seneca, 
Arion, 9.1, 1970, 5-41; C. SEGAL, Boundary Violation and the Landscape of the Self 
in Senecan Tragedy, Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Seneca, J. FITCH (ed.), 
Oxford, 136-45; WILSON, op. cit., 88-112; LITTLEWOOD, loc. cit. 
7 Op. cit. 
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meaningfulness.8 Though interpreters of Seneca have recognized the entanglement of 
Hercules’ celestial aspirations with Juno’s infernal malignity9, surprisingly little effort 
has been made to reflect on how the tragedy’s portrayal of impersonal powers could 
complicate – arguably for the better – Stoic positions around cognition, emotion, or 
moral responsibility10.     
 In this article, I will borrow ideas from several modern theorists in order to 
suggest how Seneca’s delirium, conflict with an angry god, and struggle to find 
meaning in his crime can be made to supplement Stoic thinking. My primary point of 
reference will be the works of Bernard Stiegler, whose philosophy illuminates the 
entanglement of psychology with ethics, sociology, technics, and spirituality. This 
provides an important counterpoint to the emphasis on individual cognition in ancient 
Stoicism cognitive-behavioral neo-Stoicism11. I wish to make explicit that I by no 
means impute to Seneca the lessons articulated here. Part of the value of good fiction 
is that its meanings exceed the author’s intentions. The Stieglerian lens reveals 
saliences and patterns that Seneca could not have seen in the same way. Seneca’s text, 
in turn, gives new significance to Stiegler’s philosophy, especially his pervasive but 
nebulous “spirituality”12.    
I. A Traditional Stoic Reading 
                                                        
8 Euripides’ Heracles in the Flesh, Classical Antiquity, 27.2, 2008, 231-81.  
9 Esp. LITTLEWOOD, op. cit., 107-19. 
10 An exception is ROSENMEYER, op. cit.  
11 Regarding the latter, see D. J. ROBERTSON, The Stoic Influence on Modern 
Psychotherapy, The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, J. SELLARS (ed.), 
London, Routledge, 374-88. 
12 In this I continue the project foreshadowed in From Metaphysics to Ethics (with 
Bernard Stiegler, Heraclitus, and Aristotle), Contemporary Encounters with Ancient 
Metaphysics, D. GREENSTINE and R. JOHNSON (eds.), Edinburgh, 2017, 323-28.  
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 It would be obtuse to attempt to reduce Hercules to “didactic Stoicism13.” 
Problems around manly virtue, fury, affection, compassion, and proximity to gods are 
prominent in the Greek and Roman dramatic and epic traditions. On the other hand, 
philosophical reflection on the relation of Hercules’ exploits to true virtue and 
godlikeness goes back at least to Antisthenes in the early fourth century BCE14. So it 
is worth noting how elements of Seneca’s tragedy lend themselves to a Stoic reading. 
Such a reading will revolve around three overlapping questions: What is good? What 
is virtue? and what does Jupiter want from Hercules?   
 I will start with the question of the good. Although the word “good” (bonus) 
appears only three times in Hercules (252, 525, 1259), the last of these appearances is 
interpretively important. It occurs after Hercules’ delirium has passed: 
Now I’ve lost all good things together (cuncta iam amisi bona): 
my mind, my arms, my reputation, my wife, my children, my hands 
and even my madness. No one can heal 
a tainted soul. Death must sanitize this crime. (1259-62) 
 
 Most of the things Hercules mentions in this passage are neither intrinsically good 
nor bad, if judged by Stoic doctrine. His reputation, possessions, and even the lives of 
his loved ones are technically “indifferent15.” What matters is how he handles these 
indifferents, which is the terrain of virtue16. Virtue is the knowledge or “right 
                                                        
13 FITCH, op. cit., 30-31, 40-44. In fact the only philosophically didactic reading of 
Heracles of which I know betrays little grasp of Stoic theory: C. ZINTZEN, Alte virtus 
animosa cadit: Gedanken zur Darstellung des Tragischen in Senecas Hercules Furens, 
Senecas Tragödien, E. LEFÈVRE (ed.), Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1972, 149-209. A. L. MOTTO and J. R. CLARK only glance at Stoic 
doctrine in Maxima Virtus in Seneca’s Hercules Furens, Classical Philology, 76.2, 
1981, 101-17. 
14 A. BRANCACCI, The Socratic Profile of Antisthenes’ Ethics, From The Socratics 
to the Socratic Schools, U. ZILIOLI (ed.), London, Routledge, pp. 52-4.   
15 Ep. Mor. 82.9-15; LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §58. 
16 See esp. Ep. Mor. 66, 71, 74, 76, 85, 120. Technically, the Stoic position is that “the 
good is benefit or not other than benefit,” which encompasses not only states of 
virtue, but also the virtuous states of true friends as well virtuous activities and 
  7 
reason17” that governs the handing of indifferents. Therefore a Stoic reading will 
maintain that the real crux of Hercules’ misery, as well as the signpost to any 
recovery, lies in his concern for his “mind” (mentem) and “soul” (animum). The 
Stoics also define virtue as “the mind disposed in a certain way.18” Hercules has not 
in fact “lost” such a disposition; he never had it to begin with. Certainly he needs 
mental “healing” (mederi) and “sanitizing” (sanandum est), but not by suicide; the 
answer is progress toward virtue by the application of reason and appropriation of 
knowledge.    
 This brings us to the second topic in my Stoic reading, which is the nature of 
virtue. Although Hercules never explicitly addresses this issue, the drama as a whole 
ponders the relation of Hercules’ mind and actions to virtue. The baseline for this 
pondering is the heroic paradigm, which focuses on the bodily and mental vigor 
associated with manliness (virtus < vir)19, actions accomplished with that vigor, and 
honor won by those actions. For example, Amphtryon asks Theseus to “unfold the 
sequence of [Hercules’] virtues” (pande virtutum ordinem, 647) – in other words, to 
narrate his deeds of bravery and strength. When Hercules believes some unknown 
enemy is responsible for his family’s murder, he exclaims, “arise, virtue (exsurge, 
virtus)! What new enemy has my father begotten for me?” (1157-8) Here “virtue” 
designates the passion and strength necessary for violent action. Finally, after he 
realizes that he himself is the murderer, Hercules calls on his father to respect “the 
spoiled beauty of my virtue” (violatum decus virtutis) and permit him to kill himself. 
                                                                                                                                                              
eupatheiai (A. A. LONG and D. N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 
Cambridge, 1987, §60G-M). 
17 Nihil enim aliud est virtus quam recta ratio, Ep. Mor. 66.32. Cf. Ep. Mor. 31.8, 
45.28; LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §61D, H. 
18 Sen. Ep. Mor. 113.1-25.  
19 This complex goes back to Achilles, as M. CLARKE concisely explains in Manhood 
and Heroism, The Cambridge Companion to Homer, R. FOWLER (ed.), Cambridge, 
2004, pp. 74-90.  
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Here “virtue” connotes the honor that rewards brave, strong, violent deeds, especially 
when they are undertaken on behalf of the community.  
 From a Stoic perspective, this heroic paradigm has both serious faults and 
seeds of truth. The most important fault lies in the proximity of manly virtue to 
passions like “anger” (ira) and “fury” (furor). The Stoics believe that passions are 
hasty, incorrect, or unstable judgments about what is good or bad and how it is 
appropriate to react, which are accompanied by characteristic affects. Moreover, as a 
situation develops, one passionate judgment triggers another. The intensity of the 
affects and the entanglement of related judgments make passions resistant to 
correction20. For example, anger is a class of desire, specifically “a desire to punish 
someone by whom you believe yourself to have been injured” (Lact. De Ira Dei 
17.13); while “desire” is a hasty, incorrect, or unstable “belief about a future good, 
that it would be beneficial to have it available now” (Cic. Tusc. 4.14). Such a belief is 
accompanied by a powerful feeling of expansion, distension, or anticipation (ibid., 
4.1521), which makes critical reflection practically impossible. Thus the Stoics say the 
angry person is “temporarily insane” (Sen. De Ira 1.2). Moreover, they say that 
anyone prone to anger is also insane, even if he appears calm most of the time. Cicero 
provides a helpful illustration: 
The Stoics say all fools are insane just as all swamps stink.  
 “Not always,” you object.  
 Stir one up, and you’ll smell it.  
 In the same way, an irascible person isn’t always angry. But provoke 
him, and you’ll see him become furious. (ibid. 4.54)  
 
 This analysis can illuminate many details in Hercules22. Let us hypothesize 
that Hercules has a propensity toward anger before he enters the play’s action, just as 
                                                        
20 M. GRAVER’s analysis is unsurpassed: Stoicism and Emotion, Chicago, 2007.  
21 Cf. LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §65B-D.  
22 My reading here is anticipated in some details by Fitch, op. cit., 24-40.  
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an undisturbed swamp contains noxious vapors. We will then be unsurprised that he 
becomes angry as soon as he arrives, like a swamp stinks when stirred up. When he 
learns about Lycus’ tyranny, he declares, “Let the victim23 be slaughtered, and let my 
virtue bear this stain! ... I’m carried off to drink my enemy’s blood” (634-6)! Since he 
speaks of a “stain” (notam), Hercules obviously grasps that being “carried off” or 
“carried away” (feror) in pursuit of vengeance compromises his own virtue. The 
implicit role of anger here requires elucidation: we must recall that anger’s object is 
always vengeance, and that it always “gets carried away” – in other words, its 
judgments become resistant to correction. After Hercules recovers from delirium, the 
role of anger becomes explicit. “Let everyone feel my anger!” he exclaims. “Anyone 
who conceals my enemy is my enemy” (1167-8)! Soon he realizes that he himself is 
the culprit, and cries out for punishment (1201-18). “His heart, still filled with stormy 
confusion, has not yet abandoned its anger,” Amphitryon comments, “and like all 
furious people, he rages against himself” (1219-21). Thus the class of his enemies 
first expands to encompass the entire universe, then shrinks to a self-annihilating 
point. If we accept the Stoic view that anger makes claims about the world, we can 
posit a continuum between this “stormy confusion” (tumultu attonito, 1219) and his 
earlier delirium (988-1019). The former implicitly accuses everyone of wronging him, 
and opines it would be good to take his own life; the latter explicitly mistakes his wife 
for Juno and his children for Lycus’, and opines it would be good to kill them. In both 
cases his anger makes false claims about reality, and in this sense he is “mad.” 
 The play’s underworld imagery can also be read as a reflection of Hercules’ 
impassioned madness. Seneca has Theseus describe at great length the darkness, 
frigidity, stillness, squalor, and gaping voids of Hades (662-759). In a Stoic vein, we 
                                                        
23 Reading hostia for the manuscripts’ hostis, with Fitch, op. cit., 285-6.    
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might interpret this as a world emptied of the divine “breath” that gives vitality and 
identity to beings and events24. This gives new significance to the fact that Hercules, 
like Orpheus and Aeneas, never entirely escapes Hades25. “You think you’ve escaped 
from Styx and the ghosts of the dead, savage one?” Juno asks. “I’ll show you Hell 
right here” (90-91). Everywhere is hellish for Hercules, because he is alienated from 
the being and meaning of things26. This is another face of his insanity.  
 Gradually Theseus and Amphitryon persuade him to give up his rage, and thus 
genuinely to begin extracting himself from hell. In the process, Theseus hints at a 
reconceptualization of virtue: “Now you must exhibit truly great virtue: forbid 
Hercules to be angry” (1276-7). On a Stoic reading, the injunction here is not to 
govern his manly spirits, even though Hercules himself understands it that way. He 
seems still to associate “virtue” with passionate commitments to action and honor. 
“Yield, virtue,” he tells himself, “and endure your father’s command [to go on 
living]” (1315). But Hercules’ understanding is wrong: his task is a much more 
thorough transformation, in which correct reasoning and courage will replace volatile 
indignation and vengefulness (cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.48-53).   
 The heroic paradigm is not all bad: imperial Stoics like Epictetus and Seneca 
also see presentiments of truth in it. Consider the opening choral ode (125-201), 
which Seneca has adapted from Euripides’ tragedy Phaethon27. On the one hand, 
Phaethon’s story foreshadows Hercules’ own disaster. “Your heart is too brave, 
                                                        
24 Seneca rhapsodizes about “breath” throughout NQ 2.4-11. For an overview of 
relevant physical and theological doctrines, see LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §45-7.  
25 Orpheus: 561-92, with FITCH, op. cit., 253; Aeneas: WILSON, op. cit., 99-100.  
26 Cf. MICHAUD, op. cit., 15-6. On the impassioned misery that accompanies folly in 
Senecan prose, see K. LAMPE, Seneca’s Nausea: ‘Existential’ Experiences and Julio-
Claudian Literature, Helios, 2008, 67-87. 
27 Lines 63-100 in Fragments: Oedipus-Chrysippus. Other Fragments, C. COLLARD, 
M. CROPP (eds. and trans.), Cambridge, Harvard, 2009. The convergences are 
tabulated by FITCH, op. cit., 158-60. Seneca undoubtedly has in mind Ovid, Met. 
1.750-2.416, as well; cf. n.5 above.  
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Alcides,” the chorus sings, “when you rush to visit the lugubrious dead. ... Spirited 
virtue has a long way to fall” (alte virtus animosa cadit, 186-201). On the other hand, 
in his prose works Seneca is entirely capable of praising Phaethon’s lofty ambitions 
(Prov. 5.9-11), and more than once he appropriates Apollo’s words to Ascanius from 
Virgil’s Aeneid: “This is the pathway to the stars!” (Aen. 641; Sen. Ep. Mor. 48.11, 
73.15) Both Seneca and Epictetus present Stoicism as an athletic-cum-military 
ordeal28. Megara’s words resonate with this heroic vision of Stoicism when she claims 
that “Virtue involves taming what everyone fears” and “it’s no easy path from the 
earth to the stars” (435-7). So too Hercules’ prayer for “Fortune to be vanquished by 
my hand” tropes wisdom as victory over an enemy (1271-2). But Hercules fails to 
understand what this means in practice, which is that “vanquishing Fortune” means 
shifting his priorities from indifferents to the way they are used, prominently 
including their role in personal relationships29. Hercules’ friendly relationship with 
Theseus and filial one with Amphtryon should determine the way he treats things like 
pleasure and pain, health, wealth, and life itself. In this respect the play’s ending, 
where Hercules preserves his life for his father’s sake, marks a hopeful new departure.  
 We have seen how a Stoic approach to the good in Hercules leads naturally to 
a critical analysis of his conception of virtue, and how this analysis illuminates the 
nature of his insanity. This brings me to the last part of this section, which concerns 
the will of Jupiter. Let us first observe that misunderstandings of divine thought and 
intention are yet another factor in Hercules’ anger. Both Juno and Hercules claim that 
                                                        
28 On Hercules and Phaethon, see LITTLEWOOD, op. cit., 107-27. On life as a 
providential ordeal, see A. A. LONG, Epictetus: a Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, 
Oxford, 2002, 195-6; J. SELLARS, Indifference and Affirmation: Michel Foucault on 
Stoic Fate and Providence, French and Italian Stoicisms, K. LAMPE and J. SCHOLTZ 
(ed.), London, Bloomsbury, forthcoming.   
29 Cf. nn. 15-7 with T. BRENNAN, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, & Fate, Oxford, 
2005, 119-230.  
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Jupiter has “promised the stars” to Hercules (23, 959). But no one in the play 
understands how Jupiter is honoring this promise. That is why Amphitryon complains 
to “Olympus’ governor and the universe’s arbiter” about Hercules’ hard life and the 
corruption of the world (205-74), and ultimately abandons his prayer to “the governor 
and father of the heavenly ones” (516-19). In other words, Amphitryon loses 
confidence that he can understand and count on Jupiter’s will. It also helps to explain 
why Hercules, in his delirium, turns against Jupiter: he threatens to pursue Juno “even 
if you flee to the concealment of the Thunderer’s bosom” (1010) and “freeing Saturn 
from his chains, to release my grandfather against the helpless kingdom of my 
faithless father” (965-7). This is an expression of anger: Hercules believes Jupiter has 
wronged him, and wants to punish him. It is also a form of insanity, because 
Hercules’s belief is entirely wrong, and is carrying him away from reality.   
 Let me conclude by noting that Hercules’ alienation from Jupiter is tightly 
connected to his misunderstanding of virtue. Here we must remember that a common 
description of the Stoic project is “to want what god wants” (Sen. Ep. Mor. 74.20, NQ 
3.pref.12). As we saw earlier, whatever happens is what god wants: god is the reason 
things are the way they are and events happen the way they happen. But divine reason 
in this sense usually escapes human cognition; the more accessible pathway to 
alignment with god’s will is to want wisdom and virtue30. All human minds contain 
“divine seeds” of virtue, and if we strive to develop them, the gods “open the doors 
and lend us a hand as we ascend” (Ep. Mor. 73.15-6). If Jupiter fails to lend Hercules 
his hand, that is because he is on the wrong path. Less metaphorically, he does not 
understand what is good or bad, and therefore is not on the path to goodness, which is 
also the path to divine happiness.  
                                                        
30 See the magisterial treatment of these themes in V. GOLDSCHMIDT, Le systeme 
stoïcien et l’idée de temps, Paris, Vrin, 1953, esp. 77-124. 
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IIa. A Non-Traditional Reading  
 The traditional Stoic reading I have just offered sheds substantial light on the 
questions I raised in the introduction. We can now explain how Hercules’ incorrect 
beliefs about virtue, elevation to divinity, and the will of Jupiter play a causal role in 
his insanity. In this respect a Stoic would say that Hercules bears moral responsibility 
for his madness, inasmuch as it is caused by his mental assent to incorrect 
impressions31.  
 However, the phrase “inasmuch as” conceals remaining uncertainty. How 
many causes cooperate in Hercules’ madness? Note that we are still far from making 
sense of the cause foregrounded by the dramatic action, namely the hostility of Juno. 
We could postulate that she exists only in Hercules’ furious mind. But that is not how 
she is presented, so we should try to avoid that deflationary reading. Our 
interpretation also fails to explain why Hercules slips into outright delirium at 939: 
“But what’s this? Darkness has obscured high noon! ... Look! My first labor, 
the lion, covers half the sky with his brilliance, boiling with anger, readying 
his bite! Any moment he’ll seize one of the stars!” (939-47) 
 
By way of foreshadowing, let me suggest that it is not coincidental that Hercules has 
just finished two prayers and a sacrificial ritual, the correctness of which Amphitryon 
questions. At issue here are linguistic and practical relations to spiritual powers. 
Moreover, it is significant that among Amphitryon’s concerns is the pollution of 
Hercules’ hands: “Son, your hands are dripping with the blood of your enemies’ 
murder. First purify them” (918-9). The relationship between the hands’ activity and 
the subject’s agency is more complex than we often assume. Finally, it is worth 
reflecting on how Hercules’ delirious rage turns soon from his “right hand” (dextra) 
to his “slender arrows” (leves sagittas) and “Herculean weapons” (tela Herculea, 989-
                                                        
31 BRENNAN, loc. cit., pp. 52-61, 251-68.  
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91). Under their various names (arma, tela, clava, stipes, robora, arcus, pharetra, 
sagittae, harundo, spiculum), Hercules’ weapons receive extraordinary emphasis in 
this play’s final act32; even in his sleep, “he seeks his club’s mass with his empty right 
hand, tossing his arms in vain activity” (1086-7).  
 In the following subsections, I will adapt Bernard Stiegler’s theories in order 
to explain how hands, objects, and gods constitute a network across which impersonal 
powers circulate. These are not merely external stimuli, from which the mind, as a 
self-contained agency of thinking and feeling, can always in principle take its 
distance. Rather, they are integral parts of our thinking and feeling systems.  
IIb. Hands, Tools, and Spirits 
 Bernard Stiegler’s work extends into many areas, but revolves around 
“technics,” which encompasses skills of doing and making, their instrumental 
materials, and the psychological and sociopolitical structures and procedures that 
make them possible. Given my interest in Hercules’ psychology and its relation to the 
gods, I wish to isolate just three aspects of Stieglerian technics33.  
                                                        
32 Seneca obviously takes inspiration from Eur. Her. 1377-85, but gives the theme an 
entirely new role. 
33 Stiegler repeats and elaborates his positions endlessly, but nowhere lays out his 
system patiently and clearly. My selective adaptation is based on Acting Out [AO], 
trans. D. BARISON, Daniel ROSS, and Patrick CROGAN, Stanford, 2009; The 
Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit, Vol. 1 [DID], trans. by 
D. Ross and S. Arnold, Cambridge, Polity, 2011; The Lost Spirit of Capitalism [LSC], 
D. COLLINS (trans.), Cambridge, Polity, 2014; Relational Ecology and the Digital 
Pharmakon [RE], Cultural Machine, 13, 2012, 1-19; Technics and Time , 1. The Fault 
of Epimetheus [TT], R. BEARDSWORTH, G. COLLINS (trans.), Stanford, 1998; Taking 
Care of Youth and the Generations [TCY], trans. S. BARKER, Stanford, 2010; What 
Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology [WML], trans. D. ROSS, Cambridge, 
Polity, 2013.  
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 First, Stiegler posits a more complex relation between feelings and thoughts 
than Stoicism. We have seen that Stoics think of sanity in terms of thoughts34: virtue 
is knowledge about how to handle preferred and dispreferred indifferents, with due 
cognizance of one’s own constitution, relationships, and roles. In concrete situations, 
this know-how is actualized as judgments. Feelings enter as a concomitant of 
judgments about value. For example, passions begin with incorrect judgments about 
how possessions or reputation have value; feelings follow and aggravate these 
judgments. By contrast, for Stiegler thinking and knowing are always already bound 
up with moods and conditions of psychological tension35. For instance, it is only 
insofar as we care about an ideal like justice that we pay attention to discovering and 
applying it in any concrete situation. The capacity to pay attention and take care is 
acquired simultaneously with ideals themselves in relationships, associations, and 
institutions of shared caring for each other and ideals. For example, a child gradually 
learns with her parents and carers how to reflect on her selfish impulses and behave 
“fairly”36; eventually she may attend university, and learn with her co-students and 
teachers how to practice law “ethically,” “legally,” and “justly.” The important point 
for us is that know-how not only involves a system of dispositional beliefs, but also 
emotional attunement to ideals that coordinate that system’s application.    
 The second aspect I want to emphasize is that this system is extended and 
situated beyond the mind. We have just heard that individual know-how depends on 
external structures like relationships and institutions in order to be internalized as 
psychological structures. I also hinted earlier that hands are not merely executors of 
                                                        
34 The incorporeal content of these thoughts is grounded in dispositions of the bodily 
psyche with varying levels of pneumatic tension (LONG and SEDLEY, op. cit., §33A-
F, 41H4, 61C5), but this materialism has little effect on Stoic moral psychology.    
35 Compare M. SOLM’s outstanding article: The Conscious Id, Neuropsychoanalysis, 
15.1, 2013, pp. 5-19.  
36 Cf. DID, pp. 116-19; WML, pp. 1-5, 65-70; TCY, pp. 1-6.  
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the mind’s decisions. While we often speak of “the hand” metonymically to designate 
the subject’s agency (as do Latin authors37), in many situations hands move with a 
restless semi-autonomy. Occupying and integrating the hands’ energy is an important 
psychodevelopmental task for infants; pathologies such as “alien hand” and “anarchic 
hand” syndromes show how this integration can fail38. For Stiegler, the primary 
vector of integration is tool use. In fact, he maintains that “hands” are only constituted 
as such (as vectors of the subject’s agency) by their intelligent and emotionally 
attuned manipulation of objects39.  
 These objects and the technologies encompassing them are also parts of our 
extended systems of thinking and feeling. They materialize and externalize cultural 
know-how, and in this way mediate individuals’ and groups’ attention and care for 
ideals. They have their own dynamism, because their techno-material properties 
afford novel and unforeseen “circuits” for the bodies, thoughts, and feelings of 
individuals and groups: new enjoyments and motivations emerge, while old ones are 
changed. This disrupts existing circuits of caring and paying attention, necessitating 
critical reflection and creative experimentation in order to maintain “metastability40.” 
Where reflection and creativity are lacking, this can “short-circuit” attention and care.  
 Imagine, for instance, that our aforementioned legal student brings a laptop to 
lecture. The laptop then mediates how she learns in that lecture. Yet the properties of 
the laptop sponsor dynamisms of their own. Since the laptop and associated web 
technologies enable remote learning, she may decide there is no need to attend 
                                                        
37 Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, s.v. manus, esp. def. 1B3, 1B4.  
38 D. LEADER, Hands: What We Do with Them – and Why, London, Penguin, 2016, 
esp. 1-27, 77-89.  
39 TT, pp. 113-14, 243-5; DID, pp. 131-62.   
40 Stiegler follows Simondon (op. cit.) in speaking of “metastability” as the dynamic 
condition of a self-organizing system that progresses toward a unity it will never 
complete.  
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lecture. Remote learning triggers a cascade of changes in the relationships and habits 
of teaching and learning for professors and students, which both parallel and prepare 
the ground for changes in courtroom technology – with unpredictable consequences 
for how the next generation idealizes and cares for legality, ethics, and justice by 
caring for their co-professionals and clients41. The key takeaway for us is that 
“thought is not a faculty of the intellect localized in the brain any more than in the 
heart or liver: it is the product of social organization and works properly, when it 
does, through [techno-material] apparatuses.42” In other words, the circuitry of know-
how runs not only through the brain, but also through the body (especially the hands) 
and through artefacts. For this reason, psychopathology – in Seneca’s terms, problems 
of virtue and sanity – must take into account both the body and technology; it is not 
“all in the head.”   
 This brings me to the third and final aspect I want to highlight, which is what 
Stiegler calls the problem of “spirit.43” “Spirit” designates all those ideals and 
idealities toward which knowing and caring are oriented, facilitating the integration of 
circuits that run across psyches and bodies, relationships and institutions, and 
technologies and artefacts. They are metaphysically real; they may not “exist,” but it 
is through their “consistency” that social reality emerges. For instance, “the 
honeybee,” “the French language,” and “justice” are all spirits44. Let us focus on the 
last of these. The “spirit of justice” orients and integrates the bodily, psychological, 
socio-institutional, and technomaterial circuitry of legal learning and procedures. 
Ideals are “infinite,” meaning they are the inexhaustible “singularities” toward which 
                                                        
41 See recently J. DONOGHUE, The Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology, 
Public Participation and Access to Justice, Modern Law Review, 18.6, 995-1025.  
42 TCY, p. 167.  
43 AO, pp. 31-2; TCY, pp. 33, 43, 49-53; TT, pp. 118-21; WML, pp. 9-26, 59-78.  
44 AO, p. 5-7, 32; DID, pp. 89-93, 116-19, 124-27; RE, p. 10; TCY, p. 41-6, 68-71, 
100-6; WML, pp. 32-4, 43-8. 
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our individual forethought, corporate organization, and technical infrastructure 
endlessly project themselves. Both the theorization and the application of justice are 
interminable45. Metastable systems require these infinities, because it is by 
progressing toward this horizon that they maintain identity in the midst of change. For 
example, in Stiegler’s post-psychoanalytic terminology, the psyche maintains its 
identity through its (caring, attentive, and socialized) desire for inexhaustible 
sublimations like justice. In this way it avoids both the compulsion of unsublimated 
drives, which undermine its identification as an “I,” and repressive blockage, which 
stifles its self-projection toward its future46. That is why justice is a spirit, and its 
cultivation a kind of “mystagogy47.” 
 A healthy spiritual ecosystem tends to support people’s “serenity, their trust in 
life, their feeling that life is worth living, their autonomy.48” We can think of this is 
the extended-and-situated version of religious “faith.” It is a necessary component of 
the know-how we are calling virtue and sanity. On the other hand, an unhealthy 
ecosystem undermines trust, satisfaction, and the feeling of autonomy. Stiegler calls 
the system’s capacity to nourish these affective dispositions “the fidelity of the 
milieu49.” He asserts that in philosophical henotheism, as in Christian monotheism, 
“God” underpinned the ecosystem’s fidelity50. What secular modernity needs is not a 
return to god – Stiegler repudiates nostalgia – but a new spiritual ecology, which will 
critically examine problems in our rapidly evolving socio-political and techno-
material systems and coordinate their orientation to shared caring for ideals. Where 
                                                        
45 Esp. DID, pp. 36-93.  
46 See esp. LSC, pp. 42-92; WML, passim; T. ESPINOZA, The Technical Object of 
Psychoanalysis, Stiegler and Technics, C. HOWELLS and G. MOORE (eds.), 
Edinburgh, 2013, pp.151-64.  
47 TCY, pp. 36-53, with my comments, From Metaphysics to Ethics, pp. 325-6.   
48 WML, p. 3.  
49 WML, esp. pp. 34-5, 59-64, 76-8.   
50 DID, pp. 61-74, 85-90, 125, 137; LSC, pp. 76-7; WML, pp. 59-78.  
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human beings cannot articulate, satisfy, and renew their desire by caring for these 
inexhaustible shared ideals, they suffer “frustrations, narcissistic wounds, and 
melancholy51,” culminating in “fury”: “To lose the feeling that life is worth living 
may drive one to furious madness52.” Then there is the risk that spirit will coalesce in 
hostile forms, whether scattered across behavioral habits and technologies as 
“demonic” addictions, or concentrated in reactionary fundamentalisms53.   
 Stiegler believes that “spiritual misery reigns” today, because we devote far 
too little critical attention to the ecology of spirit. One solution he never contemplates 
is a new form of religiosity, which embraces and incorporates psychological and 
ethico-political critiques of traditional religious beliefs, practices, and institutions. He 
appears to be unacquainted not only with post-dogmatic religious philosophy54, but 
also with the flourishing field on psychiatry and spirituality55. This is regrettable, 
since he deploys religious terminology with such enthusiasm. Moreover, he never 
considers how polytheistic ecosystems could differ from henotheistic ones. Since the 
world of Hercules is structured by multiple divine spirits, Seneca’s text can help us to 
push Stiegler on this point. If we are to think about Hercules’ sanity, or to think with 
Hercules about our own sanity, then we must leave some space for the gods.  
IIc. Insanity and the Gods Revisited 
                                                        
51 WML, p. 15; cf. TT, pp. 123, 203.  
52 WML, p. 4; cf. DID, p. 106; TCY, p 86. Cf. A. POWELL and C. MACKENNA, 
Psychotherapy, Spirituality and Psychiatry, A. SIMS, C. H. COOK, A. POWELL 
(eds.), London: Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2009, p. 111: “loss of meaning leads 
to loss of control, for when we cease to understand our experience we lose the ability 
to take meaningful action in relation to it.” 
53 DID, p. 89, 98; WML, p. 31, 109. 
54 Two landmarks: R. KEARNEY, Anatheism: Returning to God after God, New 
York, Columbia, 2011; J. KRIPAL, The Secret Body: Erotic and Esoteric Currents in 
the History of Religion, Chicago, 2018.  
55 See n.51 and the Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group of the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists: 
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/members/specialinterestgroups/spirituality.aspx, accessed 
03.07.3018.   
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 Our primary task throughout this article has been to understand Hercules’ 
insanity and his relation to the gods. We are now ready to complement the 
explanation we offered in Part I.   
 Let us look again at the run-up to Hercules’ delirium. Recall that he only 
comes on stage once in the first three quarters of the play, when he returns from 
Hades, learns about the threat to his family, and immediately dashes off again: 
Let the victim be slaughtered, and let my virtue bear this stain! ... I’m carried 
off to drink my enemy’s blood. Stay here, Theseus, lest some sudden force 
approach. Battle calls me. Defer your embraces, father, defer, my wife! (634-
9)  
 
I have already commented on this scene from a Stoic perspective, arguing that it 
implies a preconception of virtue revolving around manliness, bodily and mental 
vigor, actions accomplished with that vigor, and honor won by those actions. Stoics 
would say that these preconceptions predispose Hercules to anger.  
 The benefit of introducing a Stieglerian perspective is that it takes us outside 
Hercules’ head and into an ecosystem, of which individuals’ passions are only one 
component. With regard to the foregoing passage, we will first say that Hercules 
participates in the spirit of heroic virtue. We will then explain that by “spirit” we 
mean a complex ideal, which contains and nourishes the currents of attention and care 
among the characters in this scene. In other words, Hercules cares for his father and 
wife by caring for bellicosity (me bella poscunt), and asks his friend Theseus to care 
for him in the same way. Passages from earlier in the play suggest that his loved ones 
have often solicited precisely this kind of care (275-7, 421-37, 640-4, 645-827). 
Spirits of intimacy and affection hover in the wings of this scene, but fail to capture 
attention or shape interpersonal care (differ amplexus, parens, coniunxque differ)56. 
                                                        
56 Cf. Michaud, op. cit., pp. 12-3; Fitch, op. cit., pp. 24-8.  
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 Additional elements of this system become apparent when Hercules returns 
three hundred verses later. His entering words are “By this avenging right hand Lycus 
fell and bit the dust ....  Now I’ll make victory offerings to my father and the gods 
above, and worship at the worthy altars with slain victims” (898-9). After invoking 
Pallas, Dionysus, Phoebus, and Diana, he reiterates that “my hand will honor the 
Thunderer” (900-14). Notice how the cultivation of ideals becomes continuous with 
cultivation of Olympian gods: thinking, feeling, and acting in the “spirit” of manly 
valor colors Hercules’ worship of “spiritual” beings, and vice versa. Moreover, both 
depend on a technomaterial apparatus: Hercules calls for the altars to be loaded with 
produce and spices, himself and Theseus to be wreathed with garlands, and incense to 
be thrown in the fire (908-18). This apparatus shapes what counts as worshipping the 
gods, which in turn influences the ideals connected to the gods and the caring 
relationships oriented toward those ideals.   
 The capstone of this ritual technology is the pouring of libations and burning 
of “slain victims.” Here a disagreement breaks out:  
Amphitryon: Son, your hands are dripping with the blood of your enemies’ 
murder. First purify them. 
Hercules: If only I could pour as a libation the gore from that hated head! No 
sweeter liquid would ever have moistened the altars. Surely no fatter or richer 
victim can be slaughtered for Jove than an unjust king! (918-24) 
 
Superficially this is a conflict between two lines of practical reasoning. Amphitryon, 
believing that it is forbidden for anyone who has shed human blood to approach the 
gods, reasons that Hercules should purify his hands (manus ... expia). Hercules, 
believing that his killings are divinely sanctioned, reasons that they constitute the 
highest form of sacrifice: “Surely no fatter or richer victim can be slaughtered for 
Jove than an unjust king!” Fitch comments that Hercules’ thinking displays a 
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“hubristic disregard of religious proprieties,” which is true57. But analysis of 
Hercules’ “hubris,” “vainglory,” and “ambition”58 remains bounded by his 
psychology; in order to illuminate why he becomes delirious, we need to adopt a more 
extended perspective.  
 It is worth spelling out in some detail the extended circuits of care and 
attention that intersect in this ritual. First, it is oriented toward Jupiter as the primary 
spiritual guarantor of the network. Second it is oriented toward a bellicose ideal of 
virtue, since it celebrates Hercules’ killing of an “unjust king.” Third, it organizes 
reciprocal caring in personal relationships, beginning with Hercules’ relation to 
Jupiter as his divine father: Hercules cares for Jupiter by “pacifying” the world (875-
92), and Jupiter is supposed to care for Hercules by elevating him to heaven (23, 959). 
The ritual also organizes the reciprocal caring among Hercules, his wife and children, 
Amphitryon, and Theseus: all are “concerned” in the victory they are celebrating, as 
victor (Hercules), assistant (Theseus), and beneficiaries (Amphtryon, Megara, the 
children). Fourth, it organizes a network of objects and techniques, namely the 
offering of fruits and spices, burning of incense, pouring of libations, slaying of the 
victims, and articulation of prayers. Fifth, it governs the energies of the body, here 
emblematized by the “victorious right hand” that slew Lycus, “my hand” that will 
worship the Thunderer, and “your hands” that are dripping with blood. These 
interlocking circuits allow the world of objects, people, actions, relationships, ideals 
and spirits to make practical and emotional sense. In other words, they encapsulate in 
this moment the ecosystem of affordances for thinking, feeling, and acting. Thus they 
contain and stabilize the fidelity of the milieu.  
                                                        
57 FITCH, op. cit., p. 26. This owes more to Greek than Roman religious norms. See 
R. PARKER, Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1983, pp. 104-43. 
58 ibid. 
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 This is why Amphitryon’s suggestion triggers a loss of reality for Hercules. 
Though he outwardly dismisses the criticism in a peremptory fashion, inwardly it stirs 
up a premonition that the whole network spun around this ritual is dysfunctional – in 
other words, that organizing his care and attention in this way will not make life 
worth living. If that were so, he would no longer know what kind of person to be, how 
to relate to other people and gods, how to inhabit his body, or what objects were for.  
 That is not all. Let us recall that he and Amphitryon believe that Juno has 
persecuted him throughout his life (213-4, 447, 614-5, 908, 1018, 1201, 1297). Two 
points should be made here. First, this makes Juno metaphysically real; in other 
words, her consistency as a hostile and ubiquitous presence sustains and organizes 
people’s attention and care. It allows Hercules’ body, relationships, weapons, actions, 
and ideals to be what they are in social reality.   
 Second, the social reality disclosed by Juno’s consistency tends toward 
instability. It is entirely possible for hateful spirits to be part of a faithful milieu. But 
when they predominate, they orient the system toward destroying enemies and 
amplifying fragile selves. These selves are fragile because they are not distributed 
across complex, resilient networks of care59. Amphitryon, Megara, and Hercules all 
struggle to counterbalance Juno’s predominance through faith in benevolent gods 
(205-74, 295-308, 516-19, 900-18). But Hercules’ moment of doubt temporarily 
disconnects him from those circuits, leaving nothing to hold him and his world 
together except self-aggrandizement and aggression. That is why he hallucinates 
enemies everywhere: in the stars (944-52), in his own children and wife (988-1024), 
in fantasies about destroying Mycenae (994-1001), and in Jupiter’s celestial kingdom 
                                                        
59 See n. 46 on Stiegler’s relation to psychoanalysis, with M. KLEIN, Envy and 
Gratitude, London, Vintage, 1997, esp. pp. 1-24; C. BOLLAS, Loving Hate, The 
Annual of Psychoanalysis, 12, 1984, pp. 221-37.  
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(960-73). That is also why vanquishing these imaginary enemies inflates his ego: “I 
should be exalted to the transcendent spaces of the world! Onward, to the aether” 
(958-9)! Significantly, all of this is addressed to Juno: “I have slain this flock for you, 
wife of greatest Jove” (1036-7). In other words, it is because Juno has displaced 
benevolent gods that a complex ritual ecology has collapsed into the repetitive 
circuitry of paranoid megalomania.  
 This explanation of how and why Hercules becomes delirious enriches rather 
than replaces the reading in Part I. It adds embodied, psychodynamic, spiritual, and 
materially and socially extended dimensions to the Stoics’ cognitivist and 
individualist approach. We need both in order to understand this text – or indeed our 
real lives.    
IId. Technology, Theology, and Responsibility 
 I have now completed the primary tasks set for this article. By way of 
conclusion, I want to comment briefly on its dénouement, returning in particular to 
the question of responsibility. We have seen that Stoic moral psychology struggles to 
make sense of Juno’s dramatic prominence. Stiegler’s approach accommodates Juno 
better, but where does that leave responsibility? The answer is complicated, but truer 
to both fiction and reality. For Stiegler, the individual’s capacity to take 
responsibility, find meaning in their actions, and deliberate about the future is relative 
to the ecosystem60. What we witness in the final act is Hercules’ attempt to rediscover 
agency and responsibility in the wake of disaster. As is common with tragedy, his 
immense guilt and suffering amplify a problem we all experience, though usually in 
quieter ways: autonomy exists only within heteronomy, so we must look beyond our 
brains and bodies in order to maintain and renew it.   
                                                        
60 AO, 19-22; TT, 230, 260; WML, 2-3, 20-21, 40-41, 110-1.  
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 I will restrict my comments to two curious features of the final act. The first is 
its emphasis on Hercules’ weapons. I have already quoted how Hercules’ hands grope 
for his club even in his slumber (1086-7). As he sleeps, the chorus apostrophizes his 
arms:  
Strong arrows, that hung so long  
to decorate his neck, 
and heavy quiver,  
blast down blows on his untamed back! 
Let the oak beat his strong shoulders,  
and the stout club 
load up his torso with its cruel knots. 
May all his weapons lament such extraordinary grievances. (1115-21)  
 
Stiegler helps us to make philosophical sense of the chorus’ poetic personification 
here. They call on the weapons to express grief (plangant tantos arma dolores, 1121), 
exact penance (date saeva fero verbera tergo; caedant umeros robora fortes stipesque 
potens duris oneret pectora nodis, 1117-20), and atone (dent arma poenas, 1235). We 
can explain this by recalling that, like the laptop in IIb, the weapons’ aesthetic and 
material properties sponsor certain modes of caring about Hercules’ body, skills, 
loved ones, and ideals. Since they are always with him, these modes of caring have 
come to define him; in this way the weapons are parts of him, as his hand’s “vain 
activity” attests (1086). Thus the chorus’ personification acknowledges the weapons’ 
complicity in his guilt. It is worth belaboring this point: the weapons are more than 
symbols of his lack of health and virtue; they are also components of this insanity. 
 That is why, when Hercules awakens, his weapons are immediately enrolled in 
his effort to make sense of what has happened: 
Give this boy my bow, 
this one my arrows, this one my mighty club.  
For you I will break my weapons. Child, for you  
I will break my bow. For your ghost my heavy club  
will burn. On your pyre I will lay  
my quiver full of Lernaean weapons.  
My arms must be punished! And I will burn you too,  
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stepmotherly hands, which brought disaster on my weapons. (1229-36)  
 
Notice how Hercules names each weapon twice over: “my bow” (arcum), “my 
arrows” (sagittas), “my mighty club” (stipitem vastum); “my bow” (arcus), “my 
heavy club” (stipes gravis) “this quiver full of Lernaean weapons” (ipsa Lernaeis 
frequens pharetra telis). It is through them that he struggles to find a way to care 
about his body, his loved ones, and his ideals. Burning his famous arms and his 
weapon-bearing hands is a way of repudiating the heroic value system. Since he sees 
his hands as “stepmotherly” (novercales), this immolation is directed against the 
entire network held together by Juno’s spiritual consistency. At the same time, it is 
also a way of caring for his murdered children: “For you”; “Child, for you”; “for your 
ghost ....” Again, it is worth belaboring this point: immolation would obviously be a 
symbolic act, but it would also actually interrupt the circuitry that individuates 
Hercules as the unwise, unhealthy, unvirtuous person he currently is.   
 However, Hercules does not follow through with this immolation. Instead he 
falls back on self-sacrifice:  “Quickly I’ll cleanse the earth: for too long I’ve watched 
the wanderings of an ungodly, savage, inexorable and wild monster. Come, strong 
hand, undertake this immense labor...” (1279-82). Unlike burning his weapons, 
turning them against himself would allow him to retain most of his existing 
orientations. In this way he would avoid the laborious construction of new ways of 
paying attention and taking care. But Amphitryon’s entreaties block this escape route, 
and Amphitryon’s fragile hand and body, needing support and consolation, displace 
the weapons from Hercules’ hands (1319-21). From a Stoic perspective, as I 
commented in section I, this could help Hercules to begin questioning his incorrect 
beliefs about virtue. From a Stieglerian perspective, removing the weapons and 
accepting intimate contact already changes Hercules cognitive-emotional 
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environment. If this were sustained, it could eventually change his positions in the 
ecosystem, which would predispose his beliefs toward change.     
 This brings me to the second enigma in the final act, which concerns  
Theseus’ portentous closing words:  
 My land awaits you. 
There Gradivus purged his hands of murder 
and reunited them with his weapons. That land calls you, Alcides. 
It is practiced in rendering the gods innocent.  
 
Why does Theseus allude to the trial of Gradivus – i.e. Ares – for killing 
Halirrhothius, the son of Poseidon (Paus. 1.21.4, Apoll. 3.14.2, Serv. Georg. 1.18)? 
Before answering, we should note that he thereby alludes to the trial of Orestes as 
well, in which the matricide was prosecuted by the Erinyes, defended by Apollo, and 
acquitted by Athena’s tie-breaking vote (Aesch. Eum.). Greek authors often name 
these two trials in the same breath (Eur. El. 1258-64; Dem. 33.66, Din. 1.87), because 
they represent the twin etiology for the founding of the Areopagus homicide court. 
The Areopagus was reputed to be the finest seat of Athenian procedural justice61. So 
why does Theseus call Hercules to an exemplary juridical procedure, in the legendary 
birthplace of humane civilization, at a topographically significant location (atop a 
rocky outcropping, beneath the temples and above the agora), following precedents 
with extensive divine involvement?  
 The concise answer is that geography, topography, procedure, precedents, and 
associated ideals all facilitate the pathways of care and attention Hercules needs. He 
could not escape his despair simply by studying and applying better ethical principles, 
because he lacks the habits of caring and paying attention that would make that study 
effective (or perhaps even possible). Just as Amphitryon’s feeble body affects 
                                                        
61 A. LANNI, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens, Cambridge, 2006, 
78-9.  
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Hercules differently than his words, so the Areopagus may function as an extended 
scaffold and container for psychological experience. Part of that experience will be 
forging new relationships with gods. Though Juno in particular has been a 
pathogenetic force in Hercules’ life, the solution suggested by Theseus is not to give 
up Hercules’ yearning for heaven. In ways that Stiegler ignores and Seneca only hints 
at, a world of many gods coordinated with many skills, materials, relationships, 
groups and ideals also provides many possibilities for self-cultivation and therapy62. It 
is by dramatizing this capacious vision of sanity, virtue, and spirituality that Seneca’s 
Hercules supports our critical reflection on both Stoic and Stieglerian theories.  
 
                                                        
62 The starting point for exploring this issue would be to create a dialogue between J. 
HILLMAN’s post-Jungian return to Greece in Revision-ing Psychology, London, 
Harper, 1975, and the structuralist synthesis of V. PIRENNE DELFORGE and G. 
PIRONTI, Many into One, The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion, E. 
EIDINOW and J. KINDT (eds.), Oxford, 2015, 39-47.   
